What Does "Testing" Tell Us About the Incidence of
Discrimination in Housing Markets?'
MichaelJ Yelnosky"
Professor Paula Franzese, the organizer of this symposium, asked
me to respond briefly to the following question: "What do we know
about the incidence of discrimination in housing?" The question
implies that there is a real-world phenomenon - housing discrimination - that is important to understand. Although academics often
ignore reality,' I assume most would agree that it is important to determine whether housing discrimination exists, how much there is,
and what form or forms it takes. This information can help determine whether intervention in housing markets is appropriate and,
over time, help measure the efficacy of various regulatory approaches.! Thus, my first response to Professor Franzese is, "That is a
good question."
My second response is, "That is a hard question." I have encountered it in studying the law's prohibition of employment discrimination. The two phenomena, housing discrimination and employment discrimination, have something important in common for
our purposes. They are difficult to measure because they are often
t Editor's Note: This article is based upon a presentation given at the Housing
and Hope Symposium at Seton Hall University School of Law.
Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; Visiting Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law (1998-1999). B.S., University of
Vermont, 1982; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1987.
The author thanks Professor Paula Franzese for inviting him to participate in
this symposium.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Madison Lecture: Against Constitutional Theory, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1998) (criticizing the "academification" of law school professors - an increased emphasis on theory rather than empirical knowledge - which
makes most legal scholarship relevant only to other academics and increases the isolation of law professors from practicing lawyers and judges); cf Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 99, 100-01
(asserting that there is a great deal of denial in legal academia).
2 See Michael Fix, et al., An Overview of Auditin-gfor Discrimination,
in CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA 11-12, 35-37, 4142 (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) [hereinafter CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE]; William R. Tisdale, Going Beyond the Housing DiscriminationStudy:

Comments, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra, at 113-15.
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hidden, covert, or otherwise difficult to identify. s To be precise, by
"discrimination" I am referring to what fair housing and fair eiployment law call disparate treatment - the intentional differential
treatment of a person because of that person's membership in a protected class - for example, because that person is black.
Considering that definition of discrimination, the measurement
problem becomes fairly obvious. We know, for example, that real estate agents regularly refuse to show housing units to potential purchasers or renters. An agent might refuse to show a unit because it is
no longer available, because the agent is tired and wants to go home
early, or because the agent thinks an agreement to sell or rent the
unit is imminent. As long as the race of the prospective purchaser or
renter did not influence the agent's decision, an accurate measure of
intentional discrimination will record these outcomes as nondiscriminatory. To measure housing discrimination accurately, then,
we need a method for sifting through the scores of adverse outcomes
(those in which the prospective renter or purchaser is denied a unit)
and distinguishing between those caused by intentional race discrimination and those caused by other factors.5 Without a method
for making this distinction, it is difficult to know how much discrimination exists "on the ground"6 in a country where the signs that read
"No Blacks" have been taken down.
Several approaches are possible. First, one could survey the actors - ask real estate agents in a particular market, for example, "Do
you discriminate?" Or one could ask apartment hunters in that same
3 For a discussion of subtle forms of housing discrimination, see Teresa Coleman Hunter & Gary L. Fischer, Essay: FairHousing Testing - Uncovering Discriminatory Practices, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1127, 1128-29 (1995). With respect to employTitle VII proof structures were formulated in part to
ment discrimination,
compensate for the fact that evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (interpreting
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1996)); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104
F.3d 300, 304-05 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (1996)). For a discussion of critiques of the intent-based approach to
Title VII enforcement see Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with author).
For purposes of enforcing Title VII the Supreme Court has created a proof
structure for making that distinction. That structure, articulated in Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256, 256 n.6 (1981) and McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), has been adopted by the courts of
appeals for use in litigation of Fair Housing Act disparate treatment cases. See, e.g.,
Gamble, 104 F.3d at 304-05.
6 "On the ground" appears to be the currently fashionable substitute
for phrases
like, "in the real world" or "out there."
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market, 'Were you discriminated against in your search?" Because of
the possibility of self-interested responses and imperfect information,
relying on a survey to provide an accurate measure of housing discrimination would be unwise.
A more widely accepted approach involves studying the aggregate results of transactions in a particular market.8 To determine the
incidence of racial discrimination in home sales, for example, the
starting point would be identifying the rates of home ownership
among blacks and whites in that market. Discrimination against
blacks would be suggested if a larger percentage of whites than blacks
owns homes in that market. However, while the differential rates of
home ownership might be the product of intentional racial discrimination, other factors, such as disparities between members of the two
racial groups in income or desire to own a home, might be at work.
Differences in the availability of homes for sale in the particular areas
where members of the two groups chose to concentrate their
searches might also explain the home ownership rates. Through the
use of regression analysis, researchers try to control for these nondiscriminatory factors and calculate a residual difference in outcomes
that is not associated with them. That residual difference in outcomes is ascribed to discrimination. If the difference is statistically
significant, the study concludes that discrimination exists, and it is
roughly quantified.9
Although courts have admitted the results of these statistical
analyses as probative of intentional discrimination, 0 the methodology
employed in a particular case is always subject to criticism. For example, researchers can be criticized for failing to control for all the
possible non-discriminatory variables that might explain the differential outcomes." If the two groups being compared are not identically
situated to begin with, and of course they never are, then differential
outcomes alone do not prove intentional discrimination. Moreover,
wholly random factors can influence outcomes. It is difficult for a
regression study to control for the agent who discourages a black
apartment seeker not because of race, but because the agent simply
SeeFix, et al., supra note 2 at 13.
8 See id. at 10; see aLsoJohn Yinger, TestingforDiscriminationin Housing and Related
Markets, in A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF
TESTING 27 (Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1999).
9 See Fix, et al., supra note 2,
at 7.
'0 See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 337, 340 n.20 (1977)
(permitting use of statistics comparing the racial composition of an employer's work
force to the racial composition of the labor pool from which it drew that work force
to prove intentional race discrimination).
See Fix, et al., supra note 2, at 7-8, 12.
7
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wants to leave work early and the black apartment seeker appeared in
the office at 4:30. The point is simply that this statistical method requires an inference - from differential outcomes to discriminatory
treatment - and there are commonly reasonable arguments over
whether that inference is sound.
A third technique - the one I want to focus on - is called
"testing" or "auditing." It grew out of the work of fair housing groups
in the 1970s. Assume that such a group received a complaint of suspected discrimination from a twenty-five-year-old black male. More
specifically, let us assume that he appeared at the office of the fair
housing group and explained that he had just come from the office
of a landlord who, the young man believed, refused to show him an
apartment because he is black. The young man explained that the
day before, he had responded by telephone to newspaper advertisement of an apartment for rent. When he called, the landlord said
that he would be showing the apartment the following morning, beginning at 9:00 a.m. At 10:00 a.m. the next morning, when the
young man arrived at the landlord's office, he was told the apartment
was no longer available.
At this point the fair housing group is in the same position as a
researcher trying to assess discrimination based solely on adverse
outcomes. The apartment might have been rented by the time the
young man appeared at the landlord's office. It is also possible, however, that it was still available, and the landlord refused to show it because of the young man's race. If the fair housing group then sent its
twenty-five-year-old male intern, who is white, to pose before the
landlord as a prospective renter interested in the apartment, the
group might be better able to determine whether the black male received discriminatory treatment. If the intern came back and reported that the apartment was still available and the landlord had
shown it to him, the group would have powerful evidence to pursue a
claim of discrimination on behalf of the black male. Many groups
have used the evidence generated by "testers" in support of discrimination claims asserted by individuals such as our hypothetical black
complainant."
Fair housing groups also began to send matched pairs of testers
two individuals matched for all relevant personal characteristics
other than the one that is presumed to lead to discrimination 3 - to
identify unlawful practices "in advance.' 4 In such a scenario, the two
1
13
14

See generally Hunter &cFischer, supra note 3, at 1131-34.
See Fix, et al., supra note 2, at 1.
See Hunter & Fischer, supra note 3, at 1136-39.
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testers, one white and one black, both males or females of approximately the same age, are trained to behave similarly when interacting
with the agent, and they are assigned similar incomes, occupations,
and family characteristics for purposes of the "test."' 5 In 1982 the
Supreme Court, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman 6 held that a tester
who was told, falsely, that an apartment was not available, had standing to sue for a violation of the Fair Housing Act,
even though the
7
tester had no interest in renting the apartment.
The use of this technique to enforce the fair housing laws is not
the focus of these remarks. To respond to Professor Franzese's question, I want to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the technique
as a device for measuring the incidence of discrimination in a particular housing market. In this research context, the technique is often referred to as "auditing," to distinguish it from its use as an enforcement tool, where it is referred to as "testing."
To measure
housing discrimination, coordinated audits of the behavior of real
estate agents across the market being studied are required.' 9 These
audits began their ascendancy as research tools in 1979, when the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) sponsored a national study of race discrimination in home
sales and rental markets based on more than 3,000 audits in forty
metropolitan areas." In 1989, HUD sponsored the second national
testing study, which involved almost 4,000 audits with matched
15 See John Yinger, Access Denied, Access
Constrained: Results and Implications of the
1989 Housing DiscriminationStudy, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
at 70.
16 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
17 See id. at 373-74. The Court also held
that Housing Opportunities Made Equal
(HOME), the fair housing organization that hired the testers to investigate suspected housing discrimination, had standing to sue. See id.at 379. HOME claimed
that it had to devote significant resources to identify and to counteract the defendant's practices, thereby frustrating its efforts to assist in establishing equal access to
housing and to provide referral services. See id. The Court held that these allegations were sufficient to constitute injury for standing purposes because they were
more than allegations of a setback to the organization's abstract social interests. See

id. at 379.
For a thorough discussion of the issue of tester standing under the Fair Housing
Act and Title VII, see generally MichaelJ. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using
Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiringfor Lower-Skilled, Enty-Level Jobs,
26 U. MIca. J.L. REFORM 403 (1993); Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MIC-i. J.L. REFORM 1
(1994); MichaelJ. Yelnosky, Salvaging the Opportunity: A Response to Professor Clark, 28
U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 151 (1994) [hereinafter Yelnosky, Salvaging the Opportunity].
19 See Fix, et al., supra note 2, at 1.
19See id.
20See

id. at 10-11.
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white/black and white/Hispanic testers in twenty-five metropolitan
responded to newspaper advertisements of rental or sale
areas who• 21
properties. I review the results of that study below. Between 1995
and 1997, fair housing groups have conducted coordinated audits in
five metropolitan areas.2
The most attractive feature of auditing to measure housing discrimination is that it permits close observation of spontaneous reactions of real estate agents, sellers, and landlords to two prospective
individual renters or buyers who are alike except for their race.
Thus, auditing might permit researchers to identify and quantify
more accurately discriminatory treatment.2 Through careful training and matching of testers, the audit methodology, unlike regression analysis, can better control for the questions prospective renters
or buyers ask, the way they behave when talking to the agent, including their responses to agent inquiries, and the timing of visits to
agents.2 4 Because audits permit close observation of agent behavior,
they can help researchers identify the particular forms discriminatory
treatment might take. 25 Finally, audit results have a powerful narrative force that regression studies lack. They are based not on inferences from observed outcomes, but on instances of actual, observed,
treatment that are aggregated for study.26

21

See id, at 18.

SeeYinger, supra note 8, at 29.
23

SeeFix, et al., supra note 2, at 12.

24

SeeYinger, supra note 8, at 30.

25

SeeFix, et al., supranote 2, at 14-15.

See id at 13; Yinger, supra note 8, at 30. The narrative power of audits was
made apparent to me in an episode of Michael Moore's short-lived television program, TV Nation. Moore conducted an informal but powerful audit of the behavior
of cab drivers in New York City. A television camera documented repeated instances
in which cab drivers passed a well-dressed black male (a lawyer at a prestigious New

York law firm) in order to pick-up a casually dressed white male (who happened to
be a thrice-convicted felon). See also PrimeTime Live, (ABC television broadcast, Sept.
26, 1991) (using undercover cameras and testers to document discrimination in
employment, car sales, and housing).
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4

(Net Measure)

(Gross Measure)
Characteristic

Opp'y Deny
Minority (%)

Opp'y Deny
White/Anglo (%)

Opp'y Deny/
Diminish
Minority (%)

Black/White Rental

15

5

46

Black/White Sales

5

Opp'y Deny/
Diminish
White/Anglo%

18

Opp'y Deny/
Diminish
Minority(%)

28

8

1

50

20

30

Hispanic/Anglo Rental 12

6

43

20

23

Hispanic/Anglo Sales

3

45

21

24

8

* The minority rental or home seeker was essentially denied any information while the information was given
to the majority renter or home seeker.
** The majority rental or home seeker was essentially denied any information while the information was given
to the minority rental or home seeker.
*** Opportunity diminishing acts are defined as follows: While either the minority or majority auditor was
able to learn about the unit requested, he was treated less well than his counterpart. In housing, for example,
with more minorities. 27
one tester is offered fewer units, or the minority tester is "steered" to neighborhoods

With that simple explanation of the methodology employed, we
can look at the results of the 1989 HUD study to see what they tell us
about the incidence of discrimination in housing markets. Column 1
shows the percentage of audits in which the minority tester was denied access to the housing unit in question while the majority tester
was given access. Those figures are reported separately depending
on whether the testers were posing as individuals seeking to rent or
purchase a housing unit. In the rental markets studied, in 12% to
15% of the audits the minority tester was denied access while access
was granted to the majority tester. In the markets for home sales,
more favorable treatment of the majority tester occurred in 8% of
the audits.
Column 3 shows a dramatically higher rate of unfavorable
treatment of minority testers when the authors of the study considered what they called "opportunity-diminishing behavior." A minority-group tester received opportunity-diminishing treatment when, as
compared to the matched majority-group tester, the minority-group
tester was shown fewer housing units, quoted less favorable rental or
sales terms, steered to black or Hispanic neighborhoods, told to call
back, or not offered help finding financing. 8 The HUD study results
27 1989 Housing Discrimination Study, United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development, reprinted in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
at 21.
28 This treatment imposes higher search costs for black and Hispanic home
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show that minority-group testers received less favorable treatment
than their matched counterparts more than 40% of the time.
These results suggest that black and Hispanic home seekers are
sometimes discriminated against because of their race or national
origin. Thus, my next response to Professor Franzese's question is,
"We know some individuals looking to rent or buy homes are being
discriminated against in their search because of their race or national
origin."
What does the HUD study tell us about how often this occurs?
Can we conclude that 100% of the difference in treatment observed
in the audits is attributable to intentional discrimination based on
race or national origin? What about genuine variations in the circumstances facing the testers, such as when the unit in question is
rented in the time between the visits of two matched testers? What
about variable agent behavior that is not motivated by race, such as
our agent who wants to go home early on a Friday afternoon? What
about variable tester behavior, such as failure of one tester to follow
the script, either because of a mistake or because she wants to influence the result? Finally, can we assume that testers report their experiences accurately?2
Although there are several approaches to these measurement
problems, discussing two will suffice both to highlight some important issues and refine my response to Professor Franzese's question.
The first approach is referred to as the gross unfavorable treatment
measure, and it essentially ignores these problems by assuming that
differences in treatment observed in audits are caused only infrequently by non-discriminatory factors. It thus treats all instances of
less favorable treatment as discrimination. A gross measure proponent would assert that the more than 40% figures for less favorable
treatment of minorities, listed in column 3 of the HUD chart, are the
relevant and accurate measures of discrimination.
"Net measure proponents," on the other hand, warn that the
gross measure may overstate the incidence of discrimination by ignoring the role non-discriminatory factors may play in less favorable
treatment. Net measure proponents prefer a more conservative apseekers, relative to whites, and even successful searches often result in less favorable
transactions. SeeYinger, supranote 8, at 36.
79 See Fix, at al., supra note 2, at 20, 25-26, 29,JamesJ. Heckman & Peter Siegelman, The Urban InstituteStudies: TheirMethods and Findings, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 191, 215-16; Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail CarNegotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817, 825-26; Yelnosky, Salvaging the Opportunity, supra note 17 at 161-65; Yinger, supranote 8, at 31-32.
See Fix, et al., supra note 2, at 27; Yinger, supra note 8, at 29-32.

1496

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1488

proach to reporting the incidence of discrimination. However, they
recognize the difficulty in quantifying precisely the effect of nondiscriminatory factors on less favorable treatment. The problem is
similar to that encountered by researchers trying to refine a regression analysis to control for the effects of non-discriminatory factors
on observed outcomes. Many net measure proponents suggest using
the percentage of audits in which the minority tester was favored as an
estimate of the extent to which non-discriminatory factors cause less
favorable treatment of minority-group testers.3 ' Thus, for net measure proponents the relevant figures are in column 5 of the HUD
chart. By this measure the 1989 HUD study still shows significant
rates of housing discrimination: In approximately 25% of the audits
the minority group tester was treated less favorably than her
matched, white partner because of race or national origin.3
Net measure critics point out that using the percentage of audits
in which the white tester was favored as a proxy for the percentage of
audits in which unfavorable treatment of minority testers resulted
from non-discriminatory factors is too crude. They suggest more sophisticated statistical models to sort among audits in which the minority tester was treated less favorably."3 Some critics also assert that
use of the net measure can result in attributing a portion of the less
favorable treatment of minorities to non-discriminatory factors where
the more favorable treatment of minorities does not warrant an offset. For example, an offset is inappropriate when whites are shown
fewer houses than their matched partners because whites are being
steered into white neighborhoods with fewer units for sale.,' This
"opportunity-diminishing" behavior toward whites might actually
make us more comfortable concluding that less favorable treatment
of black testers observed in other audits was the product of intentional race discrimination. Net measure could also underestimate
the incidence of discrimination, critics assert, because it would result
in a conclusion that no discrimination exists in a housing market
where both blacks and whites are discriminated against in 30% of
audited housing searches. Instead of reporting that there is much
See Fix, et al., supra note 2, at 27-29. Heckman and Siegelman justify this approach on the ground that it is consistent with the view that whites experience little
discrimination. Thus, less favorable treatment of white testers can safely be attributed to non-discriminatory factors. See Heckman & Siegelman, supranote 29, at 198.
s2 The numbers in column 5 are arrived at by subtracting from the gross number
of audits in which the minority tester received less favorable treatment (column 3)
the number of audits in which the majority tester was favored (column 4).
See Fix, et al., supra note 2, at 27; Yinger, supra note 8, at 32.
31

33

34

SeeYinger, supra note 8, at 32.
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discrimination in that market, net measure would report that there is
none.
Trying to resolve these issues is certainly beyond the scope of
these remarks. However, assuming the integrity of the audits conducted by HUD in 1989, everyone seems to agree that the net measure likely understates the incidence of opportunity-diminishing behavior in the markets studied.3 The results of the 1989 HUD study are
similar to the results of HUD's 1979 study. And the preliminary results of five studies conducted since 1995 show gross measures of opportunity-diminishing behavior against blacks and Hispanics of 50%
in the rental markets of four metropolitan areas studied and 40% in
the sales and rental markets of Washington, D.C.3 However, no national testing study of housing discrimination has been conducted
since 1989. Thus, my final response to Professor Franzese's question
is, "Audit studies show housing discrimination exists. Conservative
estimates suggest that in approximately 25% of searches for housing
advertised in a major metropolitan area, blacks and Hispanics will be
treated less favorably because of their race and ethnicity.""

36

37

See Fix, et al., supranote 2, at 28.
See id. at 29; Ynger, supra note 8, at 38, 42.

SeeYinger, supra note 8, at 34.
See id.
See Fix, et al., supranote 2, at 35; Yinger, supra note 8, at 36.

